Introduction
Physicians' time is an input in the production of useful hospital output. This elementary proposition is so obvious that it might be surprising that estimates of hospital production and cost functions for U.S. hospitals have not generally included physician inputs or any measure of their opportunity costs. The reason for this omission is not difficult to find; hospitals in the United States tvDically bill for and compensate only those servicpg provided by hospital employees or for certain physicians in specialty departments such as radiology or pathology. But the bulk of physician services in the United States are rendered by physicians to their private patients, for which billing and reimbursement are handled wholly outside the hospital.
Nor do hospitals typically record the amount of time a physician spends in the hospital providing services to his patients there.
The purpose of this paper is to present estimates of production functions for hospitals in which a measure of the level of physician input Is utilized.
Since no data on the total number of hours worked by non-salaried physicians is available for a large sample of U.S. hospitals, alternative measures of physician input had to be constructed. As these measures are somewhat imperfect, the results I obtain should be considered tentative and preliminary.
It Is worthwhile to get some measures of hospital production functions including physicians' Inputs for two reasons. The first Is that if the level of this omitted input is related to the level of other Included inputs, estimates of their coefficients will be biased.
. For example, observed economies of scale might only reflect a systematic increase in the relative proportions of physician inputs as output increases, with the "true" production function being one of constant or decreasing returns to scale. 1 The second reason is that estimation of a production function may permit us to say something about the optimal combination of productive inputs. There has recently been a considerable amount of research on the process by which ambulatory care is produced in the United States and the possibilities of input substitution to increase output and reduce cost [Reinhardt (1972) ; Smith, Miller, and Golladay (1972) ]. In particular, this research has concentrated on the extent to which aides could be substituted for office physician time in the production of output. It is ironic that the United States non-federal hospital sector, which uses a considerably larger share of total medical resources, has not been subject to the same scrutiny. While there has been some work on the substitution of non-physician personnel in the hospital, there has been to my knowledge no empirical estimation using United States data of the possibility of substituting non-physician for physician inputs in the hospital or vice versa. Feldstein's (1967) estimates for the (ostensibly) very different hospital system in the United Kingdom do include a measure of physician input.
This scarcity of effort is not the result of a consensus on appropriate resource allocation. On the one hand, it may be asserted that physicians delegate too few tasks within the hospital, just as they appear to do in 1See Pauly and Redisch (1973) , esp. p. 88.
. private practice. The fear of malpractice charges, the possibility that "the hospital" will be able to capture monopoly rents that accrUe to physicians as long as they are nominally in charge of the medical care given, and the psychic costs of supervision might account for such behavior.
On the other hand, it has been contended that physicians have an incentive to subtitute hospital inputs for their own to too great an extent. It would appear appropriate to investigate the matter empirically to determine what is actually happening.
Measures of Physician Input.
The way in which inputs are to be measured when estimating a production function depends upon the use to which the results are to be put. In an engineering context, where it is the purely technical relationships that are of interest, the most appropriate measure would be some index of homogeneous productive effort. If, on the other hand, one is interested in the behavioral response of the system, the appropriate measure is the level of input that can feasibly be manipulated by the decision-maker.
In more concrete terms, whether one wishes to measure labor input by minutes actually worked at various tasks or by hours of work for which full wages are received depends upon whether or not a feasible control mechanism exists for monitoring, controlling, and paying for only minutes of actual work. (This observation probably explains why task-analysis studies, such as Smith et.al., tend to show higher productivity for physician aides than do cross-sectional studies such as those of Reinhardt. In the former case, there is no allowance for non-working free time or waiting, while in the latter an hour of "work" really represents only the average fraction of that hour devoted to productive activity.) Even this states the matter too simply, since what is feasible may often times be too costly, and the actual methods of control and reimbursement (and hence the actual allocation of effort) may vary widely among occupations, firms, or skill levels.
All of this discussion is by way of elaborate rationalization for the use in the production function estimates that follow of the number of physicians available to provide care, rather than actual hours worked. The concrete reason for this is the unavailability of hours-worked data, but the reason for continuing with the analysis is that, at the present time, the most that might be manipulable from a public policy viewpoint is the number of physicians in an area or on a hospital staff, not the number of hours the physician spends at the hospital. In general, the kind of question to be posed is if one pours additional physicians into a hospital's cachement area, or places additional physicians on its staff, what effect will this have, ceteris pàribus, on the hospital's output? Put another way, the question is that of how physicians affect hospital productivity.
While allegations of physician overuse of hospital inputs are common, concrete description of the form this overuse might take are less common. The possiblity of overuse is probably most transparent for hospital-employed physicians; they can be substituted for the time of private practice physicians, and one suspects that there is not an offsetting diminution in fees charged by the private practice physician. A similar argument might be made with respect to nurses; they can perform actions which can save the attending physician the time and trouble of making a visit to the patient. The argument that when nurses are scarce, physicians will end up making more visits is a little weaker, but perhaps plausible, especially if one adds the notion of "highly skilled" nurses. 5 Another way in which physicians substitute for hospital inputs can be found in Feldstein, "By increasing the number of doctors, for instance, a hospital may be able to shorten the length of patient stay and thus decrease the input of beds for a given output." [Feldstein (1967) , p. 93]. While Feldstein's study referred to hospitals in the U.K., the same sort of reasoning might be applied to hospitals in the U.S., and to other hospital inputs (nurses, for instance) as well. The story here would seem to be that either rate of recovery or delay in performing procedures can be affected by the number of physicians. Where the number of staff members are few, rounds may be less frequent, and patients may have to wait in bed for the physician to come by to order procedures, perform operations, or sign discharge forms. One of the things I shall be interested in is whether any effect of physicians on output does come through length of stay.
The Model.
What the hospital might be thought to maximize is a subject of controversy. The most commonly suggested maximand is some measure of output which enters the administrator's utility function (Feldstein, 1971; Newhouse, 1970) . I have suggested elsewhere (Pauly and Redisch,l973) that it might be appropriate to view hospitals as being run in the interests of their physician staffs. Accordingly, the hospital will maximize whatever its staff physicians maximize. A reasonable maximand for physicians would be a utility function in money income and leisure, as suggested by Reinhardt. Assuming that all staff physicians have the same utulity function, the hospital would maximize physician utility subject to market and time and constraints and the production function:
where N is the amount of physician Inputs, L is a vector of non-physician labor inputs, and K is a vector of non-labor inputs. Since it may be reasonable to assume that input prices vary widely, that the level of physician inputs is almost exogenous, and that hospital decisions on input combinations may differ because of differential coverage, problems of simultaneous equation bias should not be severe. A more serious problem is whether one should assume that, once the level of inputs is chosen, output is indeed maximized. If hospitals differ in their productive efficiency, and if some maximization process analagous to profit or utility-maximization is going on, the resulting coefficients will be subject to simultaneous equations bias. Both the output-maximization models and a physician-income maximization model would suggest that maximization occurs. But if physicians maximize utility rather than profit, and if the variations in taste for leisure and input prices are large relative to the variation in productive efficiency, bias should not be severe.
In short, it would appear that the same assumptions that were made by Reinhardt to justify his ambulatory care production function estimates can be made here, and that the results will have the same degree of veracity. The fact that the sample hospitals vary considerably in size because of differences in sizes of the population to be served is another reason why outputs should vary primarily for reasons other than variations in productive efficiency.
Finally, Since I am primarily interested in the ratios of Input coefficients, simultaneous equations bias in returns to scale estimates less of a problem. S There is, however, one additional problem in the hospital estimates.
It is likely that the degree of technical efficiency will be related to the number of physicians, because of the difficulty of coordinating a larger number of physicians. Since the data to be used do not permit physicians to be varied without also changing the number of physicians, there is the possibility that the effect of physician input on output is understated.
There are two versions of the physician utility maximization model. In one, physicians are assumed to cooperate perfectly in choosing input combination and output. In the other, imperfect cooperation by physicians implies that physicians may engage in behavior which, while individually rational, leads to undesired results for the group of all physicians. In the first model, it is easy to show that the existence of costreimbursement hospitalization insurance, which covers about 90 percent of inpatient hospital care in the United States, will lead "the hospital," as personified in its (non-salaried) physician staff, to use too much hospital Input relative to physician inputs. Consider first the case in which there is no insurance coverage of physician fees. Using more hospital imputs and less physician time Input than the optimal combination will lead to higher total costs (hospital plus physician) for a given level of output. The reduced opportunity costs of physician time are more than offset by higher hospital input costs. However, the rise in hospital input costs raises Insurance reimbursement to the hospital-physician cooperative, and this will, at least In initial departures from the optimum, more than offset any increases in total costs. In effect, if insurance covers 90 percent of hospital costs, the perceived cost to the cooperative of hospital inputs is 10 percent of their true cost. Hospital inputs will be substituted for .
for physician inputs to a greater extent than is efficient.
If physician fee insurance is present, it may provide an offsetting incentive to substitute physician for hospital inputs, but only if insurance reimbursement rises when physician input rises. This will not occur at all under indemnity insurance, which is a common method of fee insurance.
It will not occur under insurance which pays the "reasonable and customary" fee unless that fee can be made to vary with physician time input. While some extra time might be reimbursable as additional procedures, not all will.
Consequently, physician fee insurance, which is not as extensive as hospitalization insurance anyway, will not fully offset the effect of hospitalization insurance on input combinations.
The imperfect cooperation version of this model suggests that overuse will also arise if the hospital does not or cannot price at marginal cost. Then each physician will ignore some of the consequences of his own actions in ordering hospital inputs which can be substituted for his own, since the cost of such behavior is spread over all patients of all physicians. One testable implication of this argument is that overuse should get worse as hospital and physician staff size grow larger.
The alternative "hospital administration utility-maximization" models developed by Feldstein and Newhouse make no direct prediction about physician-hospital input ratios, since they do not treat non-salaried physician time as a productive input. The result of overuse of hospital relative to physician input would, however, be consistent with this kind of theory if higher "quality" is equated with more hospital and less physician . input. -Whether hospital administrators, who run the hospital according to this theory, actually judge quality In this way or not Is unknown.
It should be emphasized that, inasmuch as this is a production function estimate, these results do not bear directly on the question of whether physicians can create demand for hospital services. As in other production function studies, we do not ask whether the output should have been produced, or why it was produced; we only ask about the relationship between outputs and inputs. These results do, however, bear indirectly on the question of demand creation, in that they indicate the maximum extent of demand creation, at least as far as physicians directly are concerned. That is, they indicate the maximum amount of Increase in output that could be attributed to demand creation by additional physicians when all hospital inputs are held constant.
However, since inputs and outputs are not measured in per capita terms, the results are not directly comparable to those from demand studies.
The Sample.
A sample of 165 predominantly rural counties in the 9 midwestern states was selected. Each of these counties had throughout the period 1966-72 just one short-term general hospital with more than 50 beds, so that it is reasonable to suppose that the great bulk of hospital care provided by physicians in that county was provided at the sample hospital. The intent was to choose approximately 50 hospitals In each of four categories: not-for-profit, 50-100 beds in 1966; governmental, 50-100 beds in 1966; not-for-profit, over 100 beds; and governmental, over 100 beds. There was not a sufficiently large number of hospitals with reasonably complete data in the third and fourth P categories to permit 50 observations , the second category was slightly oversampled, and later editing reduced the sample size in all categories. However, since the sample was non-random to begin with, these characteristics did not seem to justify a complex procedure of stratifying or replacing observations excluded by editing, which would have This means that my measure of physician input is a measure of the number of physicians available for patient care in the county. This is obviously not the measure of physician input most desirable for production function estimates. However, it is the level of input that is likely to be manipulable by policy. That is, public policy has been and is generally directed at getting more physicians to locate in rural areas. It is not directed at controlling the allocation of their time. Thus my results show what may be expected in terms of hospital output from adding or removing physicians.
While it has not yet occurred, it is conceivable that hospital staff appointments might be a matter of public policy. 
Functional Forms.
A Cobb-Douglas function is probably the most convenient functional form to use in estimating production functions. Whether it is appropriate is another matter. One problem that arose in Reirihardt's study is not present here. In the physician's office, output can be produced even if zero aides are employed. Results. Table 1 indicates the results using total patient care physicians (MD) as a measure of physician input, and hospital full-time-equivalent nonphysician personnel as a measure of the non-physician labor input. The coefficient on the physician input, the elasticity of admissions with respect to the number of physicians in the county, is always significant, and in the range of 0.11 to 0.17.2 Personnel and non-labor expense are 1ikeise always 2One implication of these results is that increased medical staff will lower cost per admission. Cost functions that were actually estimated with this data do indeed show that hospitals in counties with more physicians or with more active medical staff members tend to have lower costs per admission or per patient day. These results contradict the findings of Davis (1974) and Manning (1973) which indicate that, in the hospitals in in theii data, more medical staff members meant higher costs. They attributed these higher costs to the difficulties of coordinating larger medical staffs. Une way to resolve this apparent conflict is to note that the hospitals plus the increase in output arising from the greater flows of productive services from the hospital inputs.
In order to determine whether the estimates presented above can properly be thought of as production functions, it is useful to determine whether the measured effect of physicans on output varies with the level of hospital excess capacity. For the lower the level of excess capacity, the closer the coefficient on physicians will approximate the true output elasticity. The average accupancy rates of all hospitals in the sample is 70 percent. A subsample of these hospitals with occupancy rates (in any year) greater than 75 percent was selected. The estimated production function is shown in the second-last line of Finally, comparison of the first and last lines in Table 1 indicates that omission of the physician input did not bias estimates of returns to scale. Omission of physicians does, however, lead to an overestimate of both the effect of personnel and of the rate of decrease in productivity over time.
Adding the physician input makes only a modest contribution to the explanatory power of the regression, as might be expected given the high multicollinearity of the input variables. What is perhaps most striking about these figures is that they suggest that The results are roughly similar to those in Tables 2 and 3 . For example, for the full sample, P was .869 (vs. .869 in Table 2 ) and the marginal admissions product for a GP was 38.4 (vs. 31.3) and for a surgical specialist 54.7 (vs. 46.0).
Since many of the measures of input used here are obviously very crude, it seems appropriate to test the sensitivity of the results to alternative measures. Table 4 presents the results of such tests.
Output has been measured by the admission or case treated. I have argued that "quality" or casemix is not likely to differ in a systematic way across the sample hospitals, since the hospitals are stratified by size and since the populations served are all from relatively rural midwestern counties. One attempt to control for "quality" would be by introducing the number of approvals (of education programs) and accreditations, as well as the number of facilities at the hospital as independent variables (line 1, Table 4 ). While approvals were signifiiant and positively related to admissions (somewhat unexpectedly), its inclusion did not affect the production function coefficients nor contribute appreciably to the explanatory power of the regression. The number of facilities was not significant.
Measuring hospital labor input with the number of full-time-equivalent personnel and the physician input by the number of practicing physicians in the county is obviously imperfect. One possible way to improve the measure of labor input is to follow Feldstein's procedure with British hospitals and use payroll expense. If personnel are heterogeneous, if relative wages reflect relative marginal products, and if absolute wage levels do not differ, the implicit weighting by marginal product should provide a better input measure than does just counting all employees equally. Even though there is no reason to suppose that quality-constant wage levels do differ, this error may not be too severe. Lines 3 in Table 4 show the result of replacing personnel with payroll.
. In general, payroll did not improve, and sometimes worsened the explanatory power of the regression. The only exception is in the case of smaller not-forprof it hospitals. The only other charge was an increase in the coefficient on beds. A final test was to replace the measure of bed cost used in calculating non-labor input from one in which the annual cost of a bed was figured at $1000 to one in which the cost was set at $3500. Except for the expected change in the relative magnitudes of the BED and NLXP coefficients, the results were unaffected.
Since it is unclear whether hospital outputs respond immediately to the presence of all inputs, espicially beds, medical staff, and specialized facilities, since the precise dating of when an input was actually available is questionable in the data, and since standard errors may be understated owing to the presence of serial correlation, results were also obtained using seven- year average values for each hospital for inputs and outputs. The results are shown on line 5, Table 4 . The results are very similar to the pooled results of Table 1 , except that beds is now insignificant.
Length of Stay
Holding beds constant, the only ways physician input (or any other input) can increase the number of cases treated are either by increasing the occupancy rate or by reducing length of stay. Feldsteins results for Great Britain strongly suggest that when output is increased, by increased medical input or other input, average duration of stay declines but the occupancy rate is only slightly affected (Feldstein, 1967, pp. 78-79) . Does additional physician input in this sample of U.S. hospitals also increase output primarily by shortening stay? One way to tell is by including average stay directly in the production function. One can either interpret this as a "characteristic" of output which one may wish to hold constant, or as another output of a multiproduct firm.5 Line 2 of Table 4 suggests that reductions in stay are an important part of the way in which physicians contribute to output. The coefficient of mean stay is negative and significant; its inclusion substantially improves the R2.
The coefficient on MD's falls to about one-third of its former value, the coefficients on personnel and LNIP fall by 25-35 percent, while the coefficient on beds increases substantially. Since the percentage increase in cases treated is much smaller when stay is held constant than when it is left free to vary, one possible conclusion is indeed that an important way in which physicians "produce" admissions is by shortening the length of stay. It also appears that one of the reasons why the effect of beds on admissions was relatively slight is that beds produce bed-days, and that many of these additional days show up as extended stays rather than new admissions.
There are, of course, some other explanations which are consistent with these results. One is that there are substantial differences in case complexity, and complexity tends to be positively related to the number of beds and negatively related to the number of physicians.
Another, perhaps more plausible explanation is indicated by Fuchs (1969) in his review of Feldstein's book. He suggests that length of stay may vary for reasons other than medical input --regional differences in medical practice, socioeconomic characteristics of patients and area, etc. If physician 1.nput primarily "produces" admissions, not days of stay, while beds and (to a lesser 5The latter interpretation is not, of course, consistent with the simple Cobb-Douglas specification.
. extent) personnel do produce days of stay, a consequence of reduced length of stay will be a reduction in the ratio of medical staff to hospital inputs, but the increased ratio does nothing to cause the reduction in stay. This explanation would imply that there was, in some sense, an "excess" of days of stay (at least in the sense of not being needed for the production of a treated case) when medical input yas less; it suggests that some hospital inputs cannot be substituted for medical inputs in the production of treated cases.
With the available data it is not possible to tell which interpretation is correct. In order to do so, one would need to have much more case-specific data on physician and hospital inputs and length of stay. In future work, I intend to explore more fully a model of the hospital in which some inputs produce treated cases, others produce days of stay, and still others contribute to the production of both. If the hospital minimized cost for a given output, it would choose that mix of Inputs at which the ratio of regression coefficients (output elasticities) just equalled the ratio of expenditures on the inputs. (This assumes that inputs are purchased at constant prices, or at least at prices which are proportional to marginal input costs.) For those inputs for which dollar cost estimates are available -personnel, non-labor inputs, and beds --the optimal ratios and the actual sample mean input expenditure ratios are shown in Table 5 . For physicians, the table shows the shadow price of a physician --the price per physician which would yield a ratio of inputs which equals the optimal one. A shadow price for physicians relative to all hospital inputs is also obtained by calculating the price per physician which would produce equality between the ratio of physician costs to hospital costs and the ratio of the coefficient on physicians to the sum of all hospital input coefficients.
There are two main messages from these computations. First, hospitals tend to underuse personnel relative to non-personnel inputs --either beds or other non-personnel inputs --In all but large non-profit hospitals. Second, the shadow price of the physician's annual input into the production of hospital output is in the neighborhood of $17,000 per year. It is higher for not-for-profit hospitals than for governmental hospitals.
There are other costs that should be considered, If only the data were available. To the extent that In what sense do these results answer the planner's question of what will happen to hospital admissions in an area if he pours more physicians in, holding hospital inputs constant? They tell him that if demand for hospital admissions is related to numbers of physicians in his area in the same way as it was related in the sample counties, then the increase in out-put is given by the estimated elasticities. On course, if he adds physicians where there is little demand for their services in the hospital, then there may be less increase in admissions.
These considerations suggest that it is useful to measure the opportunity cost of physician hospital time in the way described above. Even such measures are not easy to obtain, but the following calculations are To this should be added the net costs (positive or negative) of convalescence out of the hospital owing to shorter stays. The relatively greater overuse in not-for-profit hospitals, as compared to governmental ones, is consistent with the notion that physicians may be able to control not-for-profit hospitals more effectively than they can control governmental hospitals, which at least have an identified political constituency.
Tests for Bias.
As dscr1bed above, the initial measure of physician input was in 4Even less is, as suggested by Reinhardt, average time per hospital visit is less than average time per office visit. Table 6 . The coefficient on physicians is only slightly lower when Md's are used. When the sample is disaggregated, it becomes apparent that, at least in 1972, there was some bias in the coefficient estimate for larger hospitals, but not for smaller hospitals. There does seem to be a little evidence therefore that overuse of hospital inputs may be somewhat more severe than indicated above.
Second, it may be hypothesized that physician hospital hours and numbers of physicians relative to hospital inputs might be inversely correlated. At least, with demand held constant, the number of hours worked in total by a physician may decline as the number of physicians increases (either because price declines or because of some pro-rata rationing effects). Moreover, as the number of physicians relative to beds increases, each physician may apend less time at the hospital. This is another reason to suspect that these estimates may underestimate the overuse of hospital inputs.
One adjustment that can be made is to estimate the effect of physicians with the physician-population ratio held constant. If one supposes that physicians work shorter hours (at the hospital or in total) when they are plentiful, or if, as suggested by Reinhardt, the pace of work is likely to be less hectic, then omission of the physician-population ratio will bias the output-elasticity of physicians downward.
However, when the physician-population ratio (or its log) was entered, it had a significant coefficient only for the small non-profit hospitals subsample, and the change there in the coefficient on MD's, while positive, was not statistically significant.
.
11.
Conclusion.
The empirical results presented in this paper suggest that, at least for the sample hospitals, once a patient is hospitalized, there will be some overuse of hospital inputs relative to physician inputs. It would be possible to maintain the production of hospital admissions even while reducing This is inefficiency in the opposite direction from that found by Reinhardt for office practices. However, it is by no means obvious that a shift toward more physician-intensive production of hospital care, even though it would lower hospital and total costs, would raise physician utility. For reductions in hospital costs reduce hospital insurance benefits. Depending on the amount and type of physician fee insurance, the result may be a decrease in physician utility. Here, at least, we have a reason why resource misallocation occurs.
is the relatively low marginal product of specialists, especially of surgeons.
Given the high cost of training physicians and surgeons, one may wonder whether the hospital output, even if that output is thought to be appropriate in some sense, justifies those costs, Of course, in practice increases in physicians are likely to be accompanied by increases in hospital inputs; the hospital inputs mean more output, but also more cost.
Another message is that even primary care physicians --GP's and medical specialists --have a significant positive effect on hospital admissions. If the goal is to increase the number of primary care physicians without increasing the hospitalization rate, the analysis above suggests than an appropriate strategy is to couple physician increases with hospital input decreases. 
